Federal Computer Week (FCW) reports how the US Army is implementing knowledge management at the operational and tactical level. Here is a prime example:
In this particular case, Iraqi insurgents placed an IED [improvised explosive device] behind a poster with anti-American slogans. A soldier noticed that the poster looked different from others he had observed, so he entered information about the suspicious sighting into BCKS. A threaded discussion developed online while specialists evaluated the potential threat. When they confirmed the soldier’s suspicions, the Army sent a message via the system to alert other units about the insurgents’ new method of concealing IEDs.
The article goes on to discuss the details of knowledge management activities that enable junior officers to share information based on the current operational reality. However, it seems that the Army hierarchy is not learning as quickly as the grass-roots:
The Army is a hierarchical institution in which a natural tension exists between junior officers and the Army brass, who want junior officers to follow Army doctrine to the letter. But junior officers who have been deployed in Iraq often feel that doctrine is out-of-date and that they know best based on their experiences on the battlefield.
A grass-roots movement to transform the service from the bottom-up has created tremendously valuable communities of practice, but Army doctrine has been slow to adapt.
There is a similar tension in large organisations in the civilian world. I recently tried to work with a large company in responding to a government Request for Proposals (RFP). Being outside the company, I knew who at the company had previous experience with similar projects, while the employees with whom we were working did not. I also knew the strategic value of this RFP, which was information not easily available to the employees with whom we were working. It seemed as if the company’s structure was designed to thwart us as we tried to develop a proposal.
In the end, it took over two weeks to get the information to the person who would have been interested and authorised to write a proposal, but by then it was too late. We didn’t respond to the RFP because it took too long to get the information up the chain of command. I wonder how many other opportunities have been lost by the company this year?
At some point in the future we will realise that our hierarchical organisational structures are outdated and do not work when you have cheap and easy communications and a relatively free flow of information. That will not happen until businesses experience great pain and, in the Army’s case, not until more soldiers have died.
Correct. The junior officers are the ones directly on the ground who can see and feel what really is happening and what should be done. Of course there are diplomatic approaches to the situation of which the top brass are more competent to address. However, situation on the ground should be the primary basis for coming up with top level decisions. The US Army may be fully equipped with the technology for offensive actions and defensive as well. But Iraq situation is sifferent. It calls for understanding the culture and winning the hearts and minds of the people which technology cannot offer. So unless the US Army will change its doctrine from technology centered to people centered, i don’t think they will be able to see a bright future for iraq.